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I. INTRODUCTION
Every day, over 100 million digital videos are viewed, and hundreds of
thousands of new ones are posted to the video sharing Web site YouTube1
Although YouTube is the most prominent video sharing Web site, many more
exist, including Blip.tv, Dailymotion, and Veoh.' Cell phones with video cap-
turing capabilities and faster broadband connections have led to more consum-
ers uploading videos to these Web sites? The uses of this digital medium range
from private to public4 and from educational to commercial.' Innovators, entre-
preneurs, artists, and casual users alike are limited only by their creativity as to
what videos they choose to post.6 However, that same creative freedom is the
f J.D. Candidate, May 2010, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. Special thanks to my family and friends, without whose love and support this Com-
ment and much more would not have been possible, and in loving memory of my father
Nestor Bleech.
I YouTube, YouTube Fact Sheet, http://www.youtube.com/t/factsheet (last visited
Oct. 21, 2009).
2 Mike Peake, The 10 Best Video Websites, THE SUNDAY TIMES (London), Aug. 16,
2009, at Sec. 8/19.
3 Jason Kincaid, YouTube Mobile Uploads Up 400% Since iPhone 3GS Launch,
TECHCRUNCH, June 25, 2009, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/06/25/youtube-mobile-
uploads-up-400-since-iphone-3gs-launch/; Posting of Marguerite Reardon, ISPs Prepare for
Video Revolution, to CNET NEWS: NEWS BLOG, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-
9983861-7.html (July 7, 2008, 7:00 EST).
4 YouTube, supra note 1.
5 See, e.g., Roger Yu, Hotels Booking Guests' Videos, USA TODAY, Jun. 6, 2008, at
ID; Susan Kinzie, Colleges Putting Their Own Spin on YouTube, WASH. POST, May 12,
2008, at Al.
6 See YouTube, supra note 1 (recognizing the user community's broad interests in
subject areas such as health, fitness, music, comedy, and film).
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basis for the growing controversy over the use of copyrighted materials in us-
ers' posts to video sharing Web sites.
America's copyright legal regime seeks to protect intellectual works while at
the same time allowing for innovation through the transformative use of exist-
ing intellectual and artistic works.' However, the Internet increasingly plays a
critical role in the lives of most Americans,8 and has also been a driving force
behind recent and significant developments in copyright law.9 The principal
organization responsible for the protection of intellectual property throughout
the world is the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"), a special-
ized agency of the United Nations with 184 member states, including the
United States. ° In 1996, WIPO member nations adopted the WIPO Copyright
Treaty" to strengthen copyright protections in light of the rapid development
of the Internet and other communications technologies. 2 In 1998, Congress
passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), 3 which, in essence,
codified the provisions of the WIPO Copyright Treaty into U.S. law.' 4 Included
within the DMCA was the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation
Act ("OCILLA"). 5 The inclusion of the OCILLA represented a compromise
between copyright holders and online service providers ("OSPs") on the issue
7 Aaron A. Hurowitz, Comment, Copyright in the New Millennium: Is the Case Against
ReplayTV a New Betamax for the Digital Age?, 11 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUs 145, 148
(2003).
8 See Internet World Stats, United States of America, Internet Usage and Broadband
Usage Report, http://www.intemetworldstats.com/am/us.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2009)
(showing that as of June 2009, 74.1% of the U.S. population used the Internet according to
Nielsen Online).
9 See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 1-2(1998).
10 WIPO, About WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/what/ (last visited Oct. 23,
2009); WIPO, Member States, http://www.wipo.int/members/en/ (last visited Oct. 23,
2009).
1 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1997), 36 I.L.M.
65, 84 (1997), available at
http:// www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/ip/wct/pdf/trtdocs-wo033.pdf.
12 See id. at 1.
The Contracting Parties, [diesiring to develop and maintain the protection of the rights
of authors in their literary and artistic works in a manner as effective and uniform as
possible, ... [rJecognizing the profound impact of the development and convergence
of information and communication technologies on the creation and use of literary and
artistic works .... [eImphasizing the outstanding significance of copyright protection
as an incentive for literary and artistic creation, ... [riecognizing the need to maintain
a balance between the rights of authors and the larger public interest, particularly edu-
cation, research and access to information ....
Id.
13 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 17 and 28 U.S.C.).
14 § 101, 112 Stat. at 2861.
'5 Online Copyright Infringement Liability Act (2006), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2877 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006)).
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of liability.'6 In exchange for the expeditious takedown of copyright infringing
materials, OSPs received a safe harbor provision which gave them protection
from liability for the unauthorized copyrighted materials posted by their us-
ers.
17
Section 512 of the OCILLA provides an extra-judicial procedure for Intemet
service providers ("ISPs") to expeditiously remove material that allegedly in-
fringes upon copyrighted material. 8 Empirical data suggests that the majority
of takedown notices are sent to service providers most often in their capacity as
hosting services under section 5 12(c) and as Internet search engines under sec-
tion 512(d). 9 A takedown notice is a written request by the copyright owner
(or his authorized representative) sent to a service provider whereby the copy-
right owner asserts ownership of the copyrighted material claims that the copy-
righted material is being used in an unauthorized manner, and demands that the
material be removed from the Web site °.2 The written takedown notice must (1)
identify the allegedly infringing material, (2) identify the copyrighted material,
(3) provide contact information for the complaining party, and (4) include a
statement regarding the complaining party's "good faith belief' that the copy-
righted material is being used in an unauthorized manner.'
A service provider who is sent and complies with a takedown notice that
merely "substantially" complies with section 51222 can avoid liability for the
unauthorized hosting of copyrighted materials.23 With the incentive offered by
such a "safe harbor" provision, providers presumably have little to lose by ac-
cepting a particular takedown notice as compliant with the DMCA and then
proceeding to "expeditiously" remove the challenged material. 4 This can result
in many non-copyrighted materials being removed.25 Without the aid of legisla-
tive modification or judicial involvement, copyright holders' ability to restrict
16 Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or "Chilling Effect"? Take-
down Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER& HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 621-22 (2005). Broadly defined by section 512(k), "ser-
vice providers" include Internet service providers ("ISPs"), online service providers
("OSPs"), online bulletin board operators, and other Web sites. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)
(2006).
17 Urban & Quilter, supra note 16, at 622.
18 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)-(d); see also Urban & Quilter, supra note 16, at 622-23.
'9 Urban & Quilter, supra note 16, at 644.
20 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1).
24 Urban & Quilter, supra note 16, at 637-39.
25 See id. at 682, 687; see also Adam R. Fox, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act:
Disabusing the Notion of a Constitutional Moment, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
267, 279 (2001).
20091
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
the use of their works will stymie creativity and stall innovation.26 Such a po-
tential abuse of power could result in the loss of balance between the interests
of copyright protection and innovation, a balance that Congress seeks to main-
tain in the American copyright regime.27 While a copyright holder has a right to
restrict the reproduction of their work by others,28 the longstanding "fair use"
doctrine, codified in section 107 by the Copyright Act of 1976 ("Copyright
Act"), permits the limited reproduction of copyrighted material without the
permission of the copyright holder. 9
This Comment examines the takedown notice procedure under the DMCA,
identifies the practical inequities of the procedure, and suggests solutions
meant to restore balance between the interest of copyright holders and third
party users. Part II of this Comment explains the potential liability of service
providers for copyright infringement by a third party under the Copyright Act
of 1976 ("Copyright Act") prior to enactment of the DMCA, and introduces
the "fair use" doctrine. In Part III, this Comment looks at the legislative history
related to the DMCA, and discusses the purposes for and aspects of the safe
harbor protections afforded by the DMCA. Part III also explains the takedown
notice and counter-notice procedures provided in the DMCA, including the
meaning of "substantial compliance." Part IV illustrates the procedural abuses
practiced by copyright owners and resulting damage potentially inflicted upon
third party users under the notification procedure. Next, Part V of this Com-
ment predicts the effect Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. will have on users of
Internet hosting services. Finally, Part VI suggests solutions and statutory lan-
guage to adjust section 512 procedures to realign them with the congressional
intent of balancing the competing interests of innovation and copyright protec-
tion.
26 Urban & Quilter, supra note 16, at 636-37, 682.
27 Hurowitz, supra note 7, at 148.
28 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
29 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). The provision provides that:
the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction ... ,for pur-
poses such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or re-
search, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
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II. THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
A. Purpose for and Protections Granted under Copyright Law
The purpose of copyright protection is "[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts."3 Under the Copyright Act, any original works of authorship
in a "fixed ... tangible medium" in literature, music, drama, motion pictures,
sculpture, choreography, and architecture, among others, are considered copy-
righted.3 The copyright owner is given the exclusive right to copy, perform,
and distribute or sell their works.32
B. Infringements
The Copyright Act provides copyright holders with an enforcement action
against unauthorized uses of copyrighted materials.33 Specifically, the Copy-
right Act allows for the "legal or beneficial owner" of a copyright to bring suit
against an infringing party.34 A copyright owner who believes their copyright
has been infringed on may seek an injunction,33 impoundment and disposi-
tion,36 damages,37 and legal costs and attorneys' fees.38 Those who "willfully"
infringe on a copyright may even be subject to criminal charges.39
At the time of its enactment, the Copyright Act did not make an exception
for liability extending vicariously from an individual submitting or performing
material to another entity acting as a publisher, producer, or host." Third par-
ties could be held liable for the infringement of those they supervised under a
respondeat superior theory due to the third parties' financial gain from the
copyright infringement." Recently, courts have extended vicarious liability to
ISPs "for infringing content if the ISP has the right and ability to exercise con-
trol over the actual user (the true infringing party) and derives profit from the
posting."42 Courts have also stated that a party may be liable for contributory
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
31 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
32 17 U.S.C. § 106.
33 17 U.S.C. § 501 (b) (2006).
34 Id.
35 Id. § 502 (2006).
36 Id. § 503 (2006).
37 Id. § 504 (2006).
38 Id. § 505 (2006).
39 Id. § 506 (2006).
40 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434-35 (1984); Huro-
witz, supra note 7, at 150; 3 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 12.04(A)(1), at 12-71 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.) (2009).
41 NiMMER & NiMMER, supra note 40, at 12-72.
42 See Joshua A.T. Fairchild, The God Paradox, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1017, 1029-30 (2009)
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infringement, based on the party's knowledge and contribution to the ongoing
tort.
43
C. Allowable Non-Copyright Holder Use: The "Fair Use" Doctrine
The "fair use" doctrine, originally part of the common law,' was codified
into law with the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976. 4' The concept be-
hind fair use was described in Emerson v. Davies:
[L]iterature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrew [sic], and
use much which was well known and used before. No man creates a new lan-
guage for himself, at least if he be a wise man, in writing a book. He contents
himself with the use of language already known and used and understood by
others. No man writes exclusively from his own thoughts, unaided and unin-
structed by the thoughts of others. The thoughts of every man are, more or less,
a combination of what other men have thought and expressed, although they
may be modified, exalted, or improved by his own genius or reflection.46
The fair use doctrine was meant to balance the protections afforded to copy-
right holders for their creative investment against the need for public dissemi-
nation of those same creative works.47 Without protections that exclude others
from freely using, copying, and selling original intellectual and artistic works,
there would be little to no incentive for their creation.48 In order to encourage
attractive innovative and creative endeavors, Congress allowed for a limited
monopoly of rights that help-but do not perfectly solve-the dilemma of pro-
tections relative to the public good and forward innovation.49 Society would be
enriched, and progress and innovation would be fostered by striking a balance
between private protections and public needs.5" For instance, a recent study
(citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004, 1022-24 (9th Cir. 2001)).
43 See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971) (stating that anyone "who, with knowledge of
the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to
the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a
'contributory' infringer."); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding that the operator of a flea market who knowingly permitted vendors to sell
counterfeit audio recordings which violated the copyrights of their owners could be held
liable for contributory infringement of the copyrights).
44 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-473, at 61 (1975).
45 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §107, 90 Stat. 2541, 2546 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006)).
46 Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436).
47 Pierre N. Leval, Towards a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1109-10
(1990).
48 See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract:
Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479, 485 (1995).
49 See id. at 484-85.
50 See id.
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commissioned by the Computer & Communications Industry Association
("CCIA") found that the fair use exception was responsible for $4.5 trillion in
revenue in 2006 and eleven million workers were employed in industries that
incorporate fair use."
The Copyright Act provides that users may use copyrighted materials under
the fair use provision for purposes such as "criticism, comment, news report-
ing, teaching.., scholarship, or research" without infringing on the copyright,
even when the user has not received permission from the copyright owner to
do so. 2 Furthermore, the Copyright Act provides a list of four factors to be
used in determining what constitutes fair use:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commer-
cial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work. 3
Strictly construed, the language of the Copyright Act relative to fair use
would suggest that this list of factors is not exhaustive." Therefore, it is not
surprising that the Supreme Court held neither a single example of use nor any
particular statutory factor to be dispositive in making a fair use determination.5
Rather, the Court found that the Copyright Act "calls for [a] case-by-case anal-
ysis" wherein "[a]ll [of the statutory factors] are to be explored, and the results
weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright."56 At the same time,
courts have found other factors deserve consideration in a fair use determina-
tion, verifying the "non-exclusive" nature of those factors in § 107 of the Cop-
yright Act. 7 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that courts "may eva-
luate whether an alleged infringer has acted in good faith. .. ." in conducting a
fair use examination. The Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc. gave significant weight to the "purpose and character of use" factor when
evaluating fair use and whether the "purpose and character" transforms the
51 THOMAS ROGERS & ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI, COMPUTER & COMM. INDUS. ASS'N, FAIR
USE IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS OF INDUSTRIES RELYING ON FAIR USE
7-8 (2007), available at
http://www.ccianet.org/CCIA/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000000085/FairUseStudy-
Sep 12.pdf
52 17 U.S.C. § 107.
53 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1)-(4).
54 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
11 See id.
56 Id. 577-78.
57 See Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1122 (D. Nev. 2006).
58 Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1122; accordFisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436-37 (9th Cir.
1986).
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original work into something new.59 However, with such a subjective measure,
the fair use doctrine provides the unauthorized user of copyrighted material
little comfort as to his or her legal standing.6" Regardless, the language of sec-
tion 512 in the OCILLA does not expressly incorporate the fair use doctrine,
leaving the position of those individuals who post material on Web hosting
sites even more uncertain.
III. DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998
In the twenty years following the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976
much had changed in the world of copyright. In 1993, President Bill Clinton
established the Information Infrastructure Task Force ("IITF"), which set up a
working group to investigate the Internet's effect on intellectual property
rights.6 After examining copyright protections and service provider liability,
the working group concluded that the future success of the Internet depended
on the protection of copyright and intellectual property. 62 Furthermore, the
group opposed any exemption of liability for service providers, believing the
risk of liability was merely a cost of doing business.63 The group found that
service providers were "in a better position to prevent" copyright infringement
compared to an individual copyright holder.64 Ultimately, Congress and the
WIPO would adopt the view of those in favor of exempting online service pro-
viders from liability.
65
59 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79. In evaluating the new work, the court should eva-
luate whether the work:
adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the [origi-
nal] with new expression, meaning, or message . . . in other words, whether and to
what extent the new work is 'transformative' . . . the goal of copyright,... is generally
furthered by the creation of transformative works .... Such works thus lie at the heart
of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright
... and the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other
factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.
Id. at 579.
60 See David Nimmer, "Fairest of Them All" and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 266-284 (2003) (examining sixty fair use cases and noting
the unpredictable nature of the court decisions regarding fair use).
61 INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NA-
TIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 2 n.5 (1995), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/go/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RE-
PORT].
62 See id. at 16, 116-17, 235.
63 See id. at 117-18. ("[Online service providers]-and, perhaps only [online service
providers]-are in the position to know the identity and activities of their subscribers and to
stop unlawful activities.") Id. at 117.
64 Id. at 117.
65 See supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
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With the exponential growth of Internet use in the 1990S, 66 the protections
and allowable claims of copyright holders were heavily scrutinized.67 In the
digital environment of the Internet, the publication and distribution of mate-
rial-whether original works or infringing works-have become widespread
and nearly instantaneous. 6' As a result, the emergent role of ISPs, OSPs, and
Web site administrators as "hosts" of user-provided or "posted" material made
a re-evaluation of the extent and limitations of federal copyright law neces-
sary.69 At the crux of the debate was the liability that service providers faced
regarding content posted by any of their thousands of subscribers." With thou-
sands of postings being made every day, a service provider faced direct, con-
tributory, or vicarious liability for hosting material that, with or without its
knowledge,7' might have infringed upon an existing copyright. 2 ISPs' concerns
only grew stronger after the Ninth Circuit's decision in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cher-
ry Auction, Inc. in which the court held that an operator of a physical "swap
meet" or "flea market" was liable for vicarious and contributory copyright in-
fringement for the selling of counterfeit works by vendors at the markets.73 As
David Nimmer noted, "[t]he Ninth Circuit's subsequent reversal of that latter
case arguably portends a liberalization of the standards for vicarious liability in
66 See Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet 4 (Office of Plans
and Policy, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Opp Working Paper No. 31, 1999).
67 See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT, supra note 61, at 1-2. The Working Group on
Intellectual Property Rights, a subgroup of the IITF, stated that "[w]e are once again faced
with significant changes in technology that upset the balance that currently exists under the
Copyright Act." Id. at 14.
68 See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998) (finding that "[d]ue to the ease with which digi-
tal works can be copied and distributed worldwide virtually instantaneously" further protec-
tions were warranted for copyright holders); Michelle A. Ravn, Navigating Terra Incognita:
Why the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Was Needed to Chart the Course of Online Ser-
vice Provider Liability for Copyright Infringement, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 755, 756 (1999); see
also LEE A. HOLLAAR, LEGAL PROTECTION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION 135 (2002).
69 See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT, supra note 61, at 12, 118, 211-12.
70 See id. at 114-16. In the OCILLA, Congress defined a service provider as:
"[A]n entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online
communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the user's
choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or received." 17 U.S.C.
§ 512 (k)(1) (A)-(B).
71 See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT, supra note 61, at 114-16.
72 See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1555-59 (M.D. Fla.
1993) (finding an online bulletin board ("BB") operator liable for direct infringement related
to user posts of copyrighted material); Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679, 681-
82, 686-87 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (finding a BB operator liable for direct infringement related to
the exchange of unauthorized copies of copyrighted material among the BB users); but see
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1381-82
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that the storage and retransmission of infringing user posted
material was not direct infringement without a showing of volition on the part of the service
provider).
73 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d at 261-64 (9th Cir. 1996).
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cyberspace."74
Given the perceived benefits of a wired society and economy, and the possi-
bility that the existing provider liability laws may hinder the growth and use of
the Internet, Congress amended the copyright law and enacted the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act.75 Congress expressed its intention to "facilitate the
robust development and world-wide expansion of electronic commerce, com-
munications, research, development, and education in the digital age."76 In its
deliberations over the DMCA, the United States Senate Committee on the Ju-
diciary noted the importance of creative industries that depended on copyright
protections in the American economy.77 According to copyright holders and
their advocates, billions of dollars are lost each year due to unauthorized uses,
such as piracy."
A. Legislative History
1. Limited Liability and Takedown Notice Procedure
a. H.R. 2180
The legislative history of the DMCA weaves a tangled web. In July 1997,
Representative Howard Coble introduced a bill that would give service provid-
ers an exemption from direct infringement and vicarious liability for user acts,
74 David Nimmer, Brains and Other Paraphernalia of the Digital Age, 10 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 34 n.142 (1996). Nimmer expressed concern that the decision in Fonovia threat-
ened to "suffocate[] the [Internet]." Id. at 34.
75 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860; see S. REP.
No. 105-190, at 2 (1998).
76 S. REP. No. 105-190, at 1-2.
77 S. REP. No. 105-190, at 10 (citing 1996 statistics compiled by the International Intel-
lectual Property Alliance, showing that "creative industries accounted for 3.65 percent of the
U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) - $278.4 billion" and that "In the last 20 years (1977-
1996), the U.S. copyright industries' share of GDP grew more than twice as fast as the re-
mainder of the economy ... ").
78 See Recording Industry Association of America, Piracy Online and On The Street,
http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php (last visited Oct. 17, 2009) (estimating losses from
piracy to the recording industry to be approximately $12.5 billion annually worldwide); see
Motion Picture Association of America, Who Piracy Hurts,
http://www.mpaa.org/piracyWhoPiracyHurts.asp (last visited Mar. 13, 2009) (estimating
losses due to piracy in the motion picture industry at $18.2 billion in 2005); see BUSINESS
SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, FIFTH ANNUAL BSA AND IDC GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY 11
(2007),
http://www.bsa.org/country/Research%20and%20Statistics/Research%20Papers.aspx (pro-
viding that the Business Software Association ("BSA") estimated market losses due to pi-
racy in the business software market at $47.8 billion worldwide as of 2007 with $8 billion of
losses occurring in the United States).
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so long as the service provider was a passive conduit of the third party user.79
In order to qualify for the exemption, a service provider cannot:
... initially place the material on-line;
... generate, select, or alter the content of the material;
.. determine the recipients of the material;
... receive a financial benefit directly attributable to a particular act of infringement;
... sponsor, endorse, or advertise the material; and
(F) (i)... know, [or be] aware by notice or other information indicating, that the ma-
terial is infringing, or
(ii) is prohibited by law from accessing the material .... 80
However, under H.R. 2180, service providers continued to be liable for con-
tributory infringement, although the bill did limit the remedy for any violation
to injunctive relief'
b. S. 1146
Later on in 1997, Senator John Ashcroft introduced the Digital Copyright
Clarification and Technology Education Act of 1997.82 More expansive than
the House version, S. 1146 provided an exemption from liability to providers
of "network services" (including both ISPs and OSPs), "private and real-time
communications services" (such as private messaging, e-mail services, chat
rooms, and streaming data), and "information location tools" (including search
engines and browsers)." In addition, S. 1146 did not mention of a service pro-
vider's ability to receive direct financial benefit tied in any way to an infring-
ing act. However, in a major legislative development, S. 1146 did contain a
take down provision removing liability if, after receiving notice, the person
removed the infringing material within ten days. 4
c. The Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act
To reconcile the differences between the House and Senate bills, Represen-
tative Coble introduced the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation
Act in February of 1998.85 H.R. 3209 effectively eliminated direct infringement
79 Online Copyright Liability Limitation Act, H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. (1997).
80 H.R. 2180.
81 Id. § 2.
82 Digital Copyright Clarification and Technology Education Act of 1997, S. 1146,
105th Cong. (1997).
83 S. 1146, § 102(a).
84 David L. Hayes, Advanced Copyright Issues on the Internet, 7 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
1, 80 (1998).
85 Online Copyright Infringement Limitation Act, H.R. 3209, 105th Cong. (1998); Mi-
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liability on the part of service providers for the passive acts of storage and
transmission of infringing material, so long as the acts were automated and
made at the direction of the third party user. 6
2. Fair Use Provision
At the same time Congress debated whether ISPs should be liable for copy-
right violations, Congress also wrestled with the extent to which the fair use
doctrine should apply to the digital environment. 7 The House Judiciary Com-
mittee concluded that fair use should only apply in those instances where an
individual had acquired authorized access to a copyrighted work.88 Conversely,
the House Energy and Commerce Committee sought to reaffirm the role that
fair use plays in weighing copyright owner's exclusive use against allowing
information to flow more freely, particularly in the digital age.89 In its report,
the Energy and Commerce Committee stated that the House Judiciary Commit-
tee's version of the bill "could establish the legal framework that would inexo-
rably create a 'pay-per-use' society."9 Ultimately, the final language of the
DCMA more closely tracked with the Commerce Committee's more balanced
approach.9 Thus, Congress intended for the doctrine of fair use, as articulated
in section 107 of the Copyright Act, to apply to the DMCA.
B. Enactment
The DMCA was enacted on October 28, 1998.92 The Act protects service
chelle A. Ravn, Navigating Terra Incognita: Why the Digital Millennium Act was Needed to
Chart the Course of Online Service Provider Liability for Copyright Infringement, 60 OHIO
ST. L.J. 755, 778-81 (1999).
86 See H.R. 3209, § 2(a).
87 See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 35 (1998).
88 See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18 (1998); see also David Nimmer, A Riff on
Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 716 (1999) (cha-
racterizing the Judiciary Committee's position as being a "point of view recogniz[ing] abso-
lute property ownership").
89 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 25 (1998).
90 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 26.
91 Nimmer, supra note 88, at 694 n.103 (internal citations omitted).
As reported by the Judiciary Committee, the basic provision would have been absolute,
with no solicitude for fair use. The Commerce Committee, however, reported out an
amended bill that 'creates a rulemaking proceeding in which the issue of whether en-
forcement of the regulation should be temporarily waived with regard to particular cat-
egories of works can be fully considered and fairly decided on the basis of real market-
place developments that may diminish otherwise lawful access to works.' . . . The lat-
ter approach carried the day.
Id.
92 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codi-
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providers by limiting their liability for user or third party posted material and
the "intermediate and temporary storage" of such material on the provider's
network.93 Thus, the DMCA grants a safe harbor to ISPs in instances when a
user transmits or posts material that infringes or is alleged to infringe upon a
copyright.94 Congress also provided incentives for service providers to cooper-
ate with copyright holders seeking to protect their works through providing
liability to service providers for the good faith removal of allegedly infringing
material, even if that material is found to be infringing. 9
C. Provisions
1. Safe Harbor for Providers
The DMCA amends the Copyright Act by providing service providers with
exemptions from liability for four categories of activity.96 The Act also pro-
vides for the takedown notice and counter-notice procedures relating to "in-
formation residing on systems or networks at [the] direction of users" and the
subsequent effect on third party users. 7 In regard to systems and networks that
host user posted content, protection from liability extends to the provider so
long as it "did not have actual knowledge" that the material was infringing
upon a copyright, and the service provider was not "aware of facts or circum-
stances from which infringing activity [was] apparent."98 If the service provider
has this knowledge or awareness of a copyright infringement,99 the provider is
then required to "act[] expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the mate-
rial . . . .""' The safe harbor clause of the DMCA also requires that when the
service provider has the "right and ability to control [infringing] activity" it
must not "receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the ... activity." '
fled as amended in scattered sections of titles 17 and 28 U.S.C.).93 17 U.S.C. § 512 (a)-(b).
94 Id.
95 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2882 (1998)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)).
96 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (2006) (providing the categories of exemption are: "transitory
digital network communications," "systems caching," "information residing on systems or
networks at direction of users," and "information location tools").
97 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), (g) (2006).
98 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (emphasis added).
99 Such knowledge could be gained by the provider itself, through notification provided
by the copyright holder, or from some other source. See infra Part III.C.2.
100 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2006).
101 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (2006). Vicarious liability, under the respondeat superior
doctrine centers upon a finding that the principal had control and financial benefit of the
agent. See supra INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT note 61, at 16, 116-17, 235.
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2. Takedown Notice
a. Procedure
The takedown procedure is the key to new protections afforded to service
providers, whereby a copyright holder notifies the provider of an alleged in-
fringement. 2 The notice procedure enables service providers with the informa-
tion necessary to quickly "find and examine" infringing material. 3 Thus, the
DMCA "place[s] the burden" of monitoring the copyright's use on the copy-
right holder, rather than the service provider." The DMCA takedown notice
procedure requires six distinct actions by the copyright holder or a person au-
thorized to act on the copyright holder's behalf.0 5 To be effective under the
DMCA, a notice must: (1) be signed, physically or electronically, by the copy-
right owner or authorized agent, (2) identify the copyrighted work that is alleg-
edly infringed upon, (3) identify the material alleged to be causing the in-
fringement-including "information reasonably sufficient to permit the service
provider to locate the material" on its network, (4) provide the contact informa-
tion of complainant, (5) include "[a] statement that the complaining party has a
good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not
authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law," and (6) provide a
statement swearing to the accuracy of the information provided in the notice as
well as to the authority of the complaining party's authority to act.1
0 6
b. Substantial Compliance
The DMCA permits substantial compliance with the statute's provisions
only in instances when a copyright holder identifies the infringed work, the
infringing material, and provides the service provider with the copyright hold-
er's contact information. 7 Substantial compliance with the other elements of
the takedown notice does not make a service provider statutorily aware of the
102 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006).
103 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBiI, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
104 Id. at 1113.
105 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)-(vi) (2006).
106 Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)-(vi).
107 Id. § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii). Compare ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d
619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that in providing information identifying (1) sites created
to publish plaintiffs copyrighted pieces, (2) stating specifically that it is copyrighted mate-
rial, and (3) guiding defendant to Web sites containing the defendant's copyright informa-
tion, plaintiff had "substantially complied with the notification requirement .... ), with Hen-
drickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (finding that the notifi-
cation requirements of the DMCA takedown procedure were not substantially complied
with when the plaintiff failed to sufficiently identify the allegedly infringing material).
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infringing activity.' Thus, the DMCA's "[e]lements of notification" ' 9 are not
strict requirements because the signature, good faith determination of use, and
attestation of accuracy do not always have to be provided by the copyright
holder. As long as the party substantially meets the other three elements of no-
tification, the burden shifts to the service provider to take reasonable steps to
cure the deficiencies of the notice via "prompt[] attempts to contact the person
making the notification.... .o
Under the DMCA, two situations can occur where the provider will be ex-
cused from having to comply with a takedown request because the service pro-
vider is considered not to have "actual knowledge" or "aware[ness] of facts or
circumstances."''. The first scenario is when the notice is not substantially
compliant."2 The second is when a substantially compliant notice has been
provided but remains uncured even after the "prompt[] attempts" of the pro-
vider to contact the complainant."3 The failure of a provider to take "reason-
able steps" to contact or attempt to contact a copyright holder who has substan-
tially complied under section 512(c)(3)(B)(ii) will result in the provider being
considered as having knowledge of the infringing materials, and lead to the
forfeiture of safe harbor protection and expose the service provider to liability
for a proven infringement if the provider does not remove the material quick-
ly. l11
4
Thus, the plain wording of section 512(c)(3) of the DMCA suggests that full
satisfaction of the notification "elements" is never required."5 Section
512(c)(3)(A) states that a notice that substantially follows the listed elements is
sufficient."6 The word "substantial" cannot be understood to have the same
meaning as "full" or "complete."" 7 Furthermore, as the Fourth Circuit has
noted, the standard of substantial following in the DMCA appears to be more
108 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i).
109 Id. § 512(c)(3)(A) (i)-(vi).
110 Id. § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii).
I ld. § 512 (c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
112 Id. § 512 (c)(3)(B)(i).
"13 Id. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i)-(ii); see also Corbis Corp., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp.
2d 1090, 1108 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (illustrating that a substantially compliant notice by itself
does not impute knowledge of the infringing act upon a service provider unless it is can be
shown that the provider failed to attempt steps to promptly cure the deficient notice).
114 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii). A service provider would retain other defenses
available to it, such as those under section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934. 47
U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
115 See id. § 512(c)(3)(A) (2006) (providing that a claim of infringement must merely
"substantially" comply with the requirements provided).
116 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) (2006).
11" Compare MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1174 (10th ed. 1997) (de-
fining "substantial" as merely "consisting of or relating to substance") with id. at 471 (defin-
ing "full" as "containing as much or as many as is possible or normal") and id. at 235 (de-
fining "complete" as "having all necessary parts, elements, or steps").
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than what is required of the copyright holder in practice." 8 Three of the six
"elements" under section 512(c)(3)(A) can be considered optional "require-
ments": the "signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the [copyright
holder]," "a statement [attesting to] a good faith belief that use of the material.
. . is not authorized by the copyright owner.., or the law," and "a statement
[attesting] that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty
of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the
[copyright holder]."" 9 Of course, the presence of these factors might lend some
support to an argument regarding the sufficiency of a takedown notice. How-
ever, as explained above, section 512(c)(3)(B)(ii) expressly states that a notice
that is in mere "substantial[]" compliance is still sufficient to place the burden
on the service provider to make a reasonable attempt to cure deficiencies in the
notice. 2°
Under these circumstances, how well can a service provider, but more im-
portantly a third party user, interpret a statute requiring a notification that is
"substantially substantial"? In most circumstances, service providers readily
acquiesce to takedown notices, even when the notices are faulty, resulting in
the removal of third party user posted materials. 2' In such cases, the service
provider satisfies its duty to "respond expeditiously" to a takedown notice re-
gardless of how poorly the notice may comply with the "elements of notifica-
tion."' 22 This de facto enforcement leaves the third party user with the difficult
and expensive task of determining whether they can prove to a court that the
takedown notice was made with a "knowing material misrepresentation."'23
3. Counter-notice
The DMCA scheme of takedown notification also provides that a user
whose posted material has been removed subject to a takedown notice may
118 See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001)
(stating that some notification requirements are "relaxed" even further in certain circum-
stances).
"9 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i), (v)-(vi); see also ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 625 (referencing
satisfying section 512(c)(3)(A)(ii)-(iv) as sufficient).
120 See text accompanying supra notes 111 and 113 (stating that a copyright holder must
substantially comply with the notification requirements and the service provider bears the
burden of taking "reasonable steps" to affect notice).
121 See Urban & Quilter, supra note 16, at 637-39.
122 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).
123 See Urban & Quilter, supra note 16, at 639; see, e.g., Online Privacy Group v. Die-
bold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (illustrating that the third-party
must determine whether they will satisfy the standard that the opposing party knew or
should have known "that it was making misrepresentations" and that "the misrepresentation
affected the ISP's response to a DMCA letter.").
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send a counter-notice to the service provider.'24 Essentially, the user must claim
that the material removed pursuant to the takedown notice was done by "mis-
take" or due to "misidentification."' 25 So long as a counter-notice substantially
complies with the content requirements of section 512(g)(3), 126 to retain its
immunity from liability, the provider must give the copyright owner who initi-
ated the take down procedure notice, and also must restore the posting no
sooner than ten business days but within fourteen business days upon receipt of
the counter-notice.121 However, the service provider does not need to replace
the removed material if it has received notice from the copyright holder that a
court order is being sought to restrain the user's allegedly infringing act.'
Furthermore, a third party user challenging the removal of their post con-
sents to the jurisdiction of the federal district court and acceptance of service of
process by the copyright holder when they choose to send a counter-notice to
the service provider. 29 Under the DMCA, a user must first agree to be sued by
the copyright holder if it desires to challenge the removal of his posting.'3°
IV. PROCEDURAL ABUSE: MISREPRENTATIONS IN TAKEDOWN
NOTICES
Given the costs of litigation, only a small number of users actually challenge
a takedown notice or sue the service provider for either improper removal or
for a delayed restoration of the material after valid counter-notice.' Because
of the unlikelihood of a user or service provider challenging a takedown notice,
copyright holders can and do, at little expense, issue a flurry of takedown no-
tices to service providers with little fear of resistance.'32 Quite notably, one
major study found that approximately one-third of takedown notices contained
124 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3).
125 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3).
126 Id. § 512(g)(3).
127 See id. § 512(g)(2).
128 Id. § 512(g)(2)(C).
129 Id. § 512(g)(3)(D).
130 See id. § 512(g)(3)(D).
131 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, A Guide to YouTube Removals,
http://www.eff.org/issues/intellectual-property/guide-to-youtube-removals#dispute (last
visited Sept. 23, 2009) (discussing the potential litigation costs and damages arising from
takedown notices and counter-notices; cf Urban & Quilter, supra note 16, at 641, 679 (not-
ing that of the 876 takedown notices in its data set, only seven were challenged with a coun-
ter-notice).
132 See, e.g., Mike Masnick, The Chilling Effects of Warner Music's YouTube Take-
downs, TECHDIRT, Mar. 2, 2009,
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20090302/0226053948.shtml (noting the efforts of the
Electronic Frontier Foundation to report "on the chilling effects created by Warner Music's
regular takedowns of videos of things like kids singing 'Winter Wonderland' on YouTube."
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significant flaws in their compliance with the section 512 elements that would
likely jeopardize their legal enforceability.'
Takedown notices can contain a number of fatal flaws. For instance, an in-
valid takedown notice can suffer from the copyright holder knowingly misrep-
resenting the use of material as being an infringement, attempting the take-
down of material that cannot be copyrighted, or failing to comply with statu-
tory requirements.' Such occurrences also happen when a statutorily valid
notice mistakenly or too broadly identifies allegedly infringing material. This
can occur when a Web site is removed because it has one infringing hyperlink
or digital image, or when an long essay is blocked because it includes an unau-
thorized portion of a copyrighted text.'35 The unfortunate and troubling result
of this is an Internet where user creativity and innovation are stifled.
A. Knowing Materially
To protect copyright holders and users from egregious abuse of the take-
down notice and counter-notice procedures, Congress provided a private cause
of action for intentional misrepresentations made under section 512(c).'36 Any
person who "knowingly materially" misrepresents a claim of alleged infringe-
ment or seeks removal based on mistake or a misidentification of material fac-
es liability for damages to the copyright holder, service provider, or user.'37
While this provision provides users with some recourse against copyright
holders, in practice the individual must determine whether the cost of litigation
133 See Urban & Quilter, supra note 16, at 666.
134 See, e.g., Online Privacy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1204 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (finding that the copyright owner "knowingly materially misrepresented that
Plaintiffs infringed [the copyright owner's] copyright interest); Corbis Corp. v. Ama-
zon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1108-09 (W.D. Wash. 2004); Kevin Poulsen, Air
Force Cyber Command's New Weapon: DMCA Notices, WIRED.COM, Mar. 7, 2008,
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/03/air-force-cyber/ (describing an attempt by the
U.S. Air Force to takedown one of their promotional videos from YouTube despite the fact
that works of the U.S. government do not receive copyright protection).
135 See Jeffrey Cobia, Note, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act Takedown Notice
Procedure: Misuses, Abuses, and Shortcomings of the Process, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
387, 392-93 (2009). The Science Fiction Writers of America ("SFWA") sent a "mass take-
down" notice to the document database Web site Scribd.com demanding the takedown of
many copyrighted articles the SFWA did not own. Id. In another example, a man sent take-
down notices to Web sites featuring a picture of him he did not own, and likely constituted
fair use regardless. Id.
136 17 U.S.C. § 512(f); see also S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 49-50 (1998) ("The put back
procedures were added ... to address the concerns ... that other provisions of this title es-
tablished strong incentives for service providers to take down material, but insufficient pro-
tections for third parties whose materials would be taken down.").
137 17 U.S.C. § 512(f).
[Vol. 18
Fair Use in the DMCA
is worthwhile, similar to the counter-notice procedure."' Courts have rarely
found copyright holders in violation of the provision.'39 The DMCA misrepre-
sentation provision does not define what it is to "knowingly materially make
misrepresent[ations]" under the notification procedure for both takedown and
counter-notices. 40 In this void, courts have provided a definition. In Online
Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., the court stated that to "knowingly materially
misrepresent[]" was akin to bad faith and occurred when the notice sender "ac-
tually knew, should have known.. . or would have had no substantial doubt
had it been acting in good faith, that it was making misrepresentations.""' The
court continued by saying that "material" means that "the misrepresentation
affected the ISP's response to a DMCA letter.'
42
In light of its interpretation of "good faith," the court's concurrent holding
that so-called "bad-faith" exists when "[n]o reasonable copyright holder could
have believed that the posted information was protected by copyright .. .
is somewhat confounding. Diebold's reasonableness test would suggest an ob-
jective standard in the statute. However, the Ninth Circuit subsequently held in
Rossi v. Motion Picture Association of America Inc., that under section 512,
"[a] copyright owner cannot be liable simply because an unknowing mistake is
made, even if the copyright owner acted unreasonably in making [that] mis-
take."'" Rossi decided that the subscriber must demonstrate "some actual
knowledge of misrepresentation on the part of the copyright owner."'45 Rossi
appears to reject Diebold's objective standard, and replaces it with a height-
ened subjective standard that makes it easy for copyright holders to satisfy
without running afoul of the DMCA.
B. Subjective Good Faith
The fair use doctrine and the "element of notification," calling for a good
faith belief by the copyright holder, that he has not authorized the allegedly
infringing use, is at most a non-requisite factor for substantial compliance.'46
Thus, the lack of such a good faith determination will not invalidate an other-
wise compliant notice under the DMCA. As seen in Diebold47 and to be dis-
138 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 131.
139 Urban & Quillter, supra note 16, at 629-30 (noting that with the exception of Die-
bold, "no other § 512(f) cases have dealt such a blow to the complainant.").
140 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f).
141 Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1204.
142 Id.
143 See id (emphasis added).
144 Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 2004).
145 Id.
146 See discussion supra Part III.C.2.b.
147 See supra notes 141 and accompanying text.
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cussed infra, the courts will scrutinize a copyright holder's good faith determi-
nation of use in judging the validity of any allegation of misrepresentation on
the part of the copyright holder made by the third party user. At the same time,
the DMCA calls for an examination of the good faith of a user issuing counter-
notices claiming mistaken removal.148 However, courts require only a subjec-
tive good faith belief on the part of copyright holders in their determinations of
use when issuing a takedown notice.'49 It is this subjective standard that most
undermines those protections the DMCA is meant to provide third party users
with. The difference in the subjective and objective standards thus causes an
imbalance between intellectual property and use protection, resulting in a chill-
ing effect upon the transformative creativity the DMCA was intended to fos-
ter.
50
C. Threat to Balance
The active use of the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA by service pro-
viders has remedied the immediate and massive liability they face.' 5' However,
no additional protections not already included in the Copyright Act have been
made for unauthorized, but legal, third party users.'52 The increasing multitudes
of Internet users are the counterpart to service providers in the Internet growth
equation.'53 From 1997 to June 2009, worldwide Internet user levels rose from
2% to 24% of the population. " 4 As of June 30, 2009, there were over 1.6 bil-
148 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3)(C).
149 Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1004; UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055,
1065 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
150 Cf Electronic Frontier Found., Unintended Consequences: Five Years Under the
DMCA, Sept. 23, 2003, http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/unintendedconsequences.pdf (listing
examples of the chilling effect of the DMCA, including effects on free expression, scientific
research, fair use, and innovation).
151 Cf Jonathan Band & Matthew Schruers, Safe Harbors Against the Liability Hurri-
cane: The Communications Decency Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 20
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 295, 319 (2002) (charting the evolution of DMCA safe harbor
litigation and concluding the safe harbor case law currently upholds adequate immunity
despite an apparent trend towards a "one free pass" rule); Mike Scott, Safe Harbors Under
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 99, 129 (2005).
152 See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
153 Internet World Stats, World Internet Usage Statistics,
http://www.intemetworldstats.com/stats.htm, (last visited Oct. 8, 2009) (showing a 132.9%
increasing in the number of North American users between 2000 and 2009, and a worldwide
increase of 362.3% for the same period).
154 International Telecommunications Union, Internet Users Per 100 Inhabitants,
http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/graphs/internet.jpg (last visited Oct. 15, 2009); Internet World
Stats, supra note 153 (demonstrating that 24.7% of the world's population used the Internet
as of June 2009).
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lion Internet users. "5 The potential volume of user posted material is astro-
nomical.'56
In the nine years prior to and including the year of the DMCA's passage in
October 1998, an average of 592,917 copyrights were registered per year.'57 In
comparison, in the nine years following the DMCA's adoption, an average of
556,378 copyrights were registered per year.'58 Thus, while Internet usage rates
have increased nearly tenfold in the nine years following the passage of the
DMCA, the rate of registered copyrights has remained nearly unchanged.'59
While the advent of the Internet necessitated new copyright law such as the
DMCA, 6 ° the disparity between copyright registration rates and dynamic In-
temet usage growth is itself reason for legislative action to amend the DMCA.
With a growing percentage of world population becoming users of the
Internet, the opportunity for infringing use of copyright material
increases. Likewise, the benefits of transformative and fair
(albeit unauthorized) use also increases."'
Were the balance of power between copyright holders' interests and the
public's fair use of these works to shift only minimally, copyright holders
could see their intellectual property rights infringed on or the public could see
its opportunities for free expression decrease.'62 While copyright protections
are rooted in the Constitution,'63 the notion of progress requires forward
movement that is impossible without utilizing and building upon existing
works.' " Thus, Congress must be vigilant in monitoring the balance of rights
between copyright holder and third party users, lest one trample upon the oth-
er.
Whether it is the individual artist,'65 a corporation,'66 industry association,'67
155 Internet World Stats, supra note 153.
156 See, e.g., YouTube, supra note 1.
157 Id.
158 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ANNuAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 58
(2007), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/20O7/ar2OO7.pdf.
159 Compare International Telecommunications Union, Internet Users Per 100 Inhabi-
tants, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/ict/graphs/intemet.jpg (last visited Oct. 8,
2009), with U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 58
(2007), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2007/ar2007.pdf
160 S. REP. No. 105-190, at 1-2.
161 See, e.g., Posting of Tour6, Introducing Jaydiohead, to THE DAILY BEAST,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-01-15/introducing-jaydiohead (Jan.
15, 2009, 06:24 EST) (describing the mashup creation by Max Tannone which combined
the beat of songs by the artist Radiohead with the lyrics of the artist Jay-Z).
162 See Hurowitz, supra note 7, at 148.
163 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Hurowitz, supra note 7, at 148.
164 See Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) ("The thoughts of
every man are, more or less, a combination of what other men have thought and expressed,
although they may be modified, exalted, or improved by his own genius or reflection.").
165 See, e.g., Posting of Greg Sandoval, Prince to Sue the Pirate Bay, to CNET NEWS:
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or even the government, 6 ' asserting their rights as copyright holders, copyright
holders or their authorized agents typically send boilerplate, vague, and poten-
tially non-compliant takedown notices to whomever makes a post that alleg-
edly includes any portion of copyrighted material.'69 The DMCA provides pen-
alties for those that "knowingly materially misrepresent[s]" under the provi-
sion. 7 ° In utilizing a subjective good faith standard for "knowing" the statute
falls short of counterbalancing the relative ease with which copyright holders
can chill the dissemination of information online by use of a procedure requir-
ing only substantial compliance.''
The DMCA's language suggests that a good faith determination of the au-
thorized or legal use of posted material is, at most, a factor related to burden
shifting in attributing knowledge or awareness to a service provider.' Fur-
thermore, the court in Rossi stated that "[w]hen enacting the DMCA, Congress
could have easily incorporated an objective standard of reasonableness [as to
the good faith determination on use] ... [t]he fact that it did not do so indicates
an intent to adhere to the subjective standard traditionally associated with a
NEWS BLOG, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9814504-7.html (Nov. 9, 2007, 19:41
EST) (describing that the musician Prince sought to sue a file-sharing Web site that alleg-
edly violated his copyright protections).
166 See, e.g., Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1151-52 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (describing an attempt by Universal Music Group to utilize § 512 to takedown a home
video posted on YouTube that featured audio of a song that Universal owned the copyright
to).
167 Ryan Singel, Universities Baffled By Massive Surge In RIAA Copyright Notices,
WIRED.COM, Apr. 30, 2009, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/04/riaa-sends-spik/
[hereinafter R1AA Copyright Notices]; see also Kellen Myers, The RIAA, the DMCA, and the
Forgotten Few Webcasters: A Call for Change in Digital Copyright Royalties, 61 FED.
COMM. L.J. 431, 434 (2009) (discussing that the "large profit potential makes it easier for
copyright holders to organize coalitions such as the RIAA to expand the legal protections of
intellectual property.").
168 Poulsen, supra note 134. While the government has sent DMCA takedown notices to
parties using its materials, no government work can be copyrighted. See 17 U.S.C. § 105
(2006); see also David S. Levitt, Copyright Protection for United States Government Com-
puter Programs, 40 IDEA 225, 235 (2000).
169 See, e.g., RIAA Copyright Notices, supra note 167; Ryan Singel, DMCA Abuser Re-
tracts, WIRED.COM, Feb. 13, 2007,
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2007/02/dmcaabuser-ret/.
170 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2006).
'71 See supra Part III.C.2.b; see also Posting of R. Polk Wagner, DMCA 's Safe Harbor is
Dangerous to Business, to Introduction to Intellectual Property Law & Policy,
http://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/polk/ip/archives/2007/02/dmcassafeharb.html (Feb. 24,
2007, 23:45 EST) (stating that the use of takedown notices can have a "tremendously chill-
ing effect on commercial enterprise doing business on the Internet"); see generally Law-
rence F. Rozsnyai, Easy Come, Easy Go: Copyright Infringement and the DMCA's Notice
and Takedown Provision in Light of Rossi v. MPAA, 2 SHINDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 15
(2006).
172 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c)(3).
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good faith requirement."'' In support of its determination that subjectivity was
the appropriate standard, the court further provided that "where Congress uses
terms that have accumulated settled meaning under the common law, a court
must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incor-
porate the established meaning of these terms."'74 Accordingly, Rossi held that
"[t]he ... structure of § 512 ... supports the conclusion that [it] imposes a sub-
jective good faith requirement upon copyright owners."'75 The Court explained
"that the words of a statute must be read ... with a view to their place in the
overall statutory scheme" and that an "'objective reasonableness' standard
would be inconsistent with Congress's apparent intent [to] . protect [users]
from subjectively improper actions by copyright owners."'76
In narrowly interpreting section 512(f), the court failed to protect users from
improper copyright holder actions in the balanced manner historically es-
poused by Congress through that body's support of the principles of fair use. 77
The application of a subjective standard of good faith by the court is merely
judicial activism.' The DMCA's enactment was based on the need and desire
for balanced protections provided to all parties-copyright holders, unauthor-
ized users, and service providers-so that original works were protected, while
also allowing innovations and creative endeavors (including fair use situations)
to be fostered.'79 With subjective good faith as the standard test for abuse, little
stands in the way of copyright holders issuing takedown notices to each and
every user posting material identified as being an infringement.
V. LENZ V. UNIVERSAL MUSIC CORP.
A modem example of an alleged copyright infringement occurred in 2008 in
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.8 ° Stephanie Lenz sought to memorialize the
youth of her children by videotaping them dancing to a short segment of the
song "Let's Go Crazy," written and performed by Prince. 8' To share this mo-
ment with her friends and family, Lenz posted the twenty-nine second video on
YouTube.'82
173 Rossi v. MPAA, Inc., 391 F. 3d 1000, 1004 (2004).
174 Id at 1004 n.4 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999)).
175 Id. at 1004 (citation omitted).
176 Id. at 1004-05.
177 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 25-26 (1998).
178 But cf H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976) (stating that the courts have a vast
amount of freedom in determining fair use).
179 See S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998).
180 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
181 Id. at 1151-52.
182 Id. at 1152; see also Posting of Stephanie Lenz to
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N 1 KfJHFWlhQ (Feb. 7, 2007).
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Universal Music Group ("Universal") is the copyright owner of "Let's Go
Crazy."'' 3 Upon learning of Lenz's post, Universal sent YouTube a DMCA
section 512 takedown notice demanding that the Lenz video clip be removed.'84
YouTube complied and subsequently notified Lenz of the takedown action. 8 '
Following the procedures set out in the DMCA, Lenz sent a counter-
notification to YouTube stating that her use of the "Let's Go Crazy" audio
within her video was a fair use of the copyrighted material.'86 Six weeks after
receiving the counter-notification, YouTube reposted Lenz's video.'87 Lenz
subsequently sued Universal for misrepresentation under section 512(f) of the
DMCA and for tortious interference regarding her YouTube contract. 8 The
United States District Court for the Northern District of California ultimately
denied Universal's motion to dismiss and its attempt to seek interlocutory ap-
peal. 89
The primary issue in Lenz was whether a copyright owner is required to
consider the fair use doctrine in making a good faith determination that the
owner's copyright is not "authorized by ... law". 8 The court also considered
whether the fair use of copyrighted materials constitutes a use "authorized by
law" in accordance with the DMCA's takedown provision.9' Universal argued
that fair use is not mentioned in the DMCA and thus it is merely an "excused
infringement rather than a use authorized ... by law.192 As such, Universal ar-
gued that when formulating a takedown notice, a copyright holder does not
need to consider whether the fair use doctrine applies.'93 In contrast, Lenz ar-
gued that fair use is an authorized use under the DMCA because it is explicitly
provided as an authorized use under the Copyright Act.' 94 The court held that in
making a good faith determination of whether an infringement of an owner's
copyright has occurred, the owner must consider whether the material's use is
183 Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1152.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 1153.
189 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. C 07-3783 JF, 2008 WL 4790669, at *1, *3
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2008).
190 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Under
the DMCA, a copyright holder alleging that a third party's use of their work infringes on the
holder's copyright, is only authorized to request that a third party takedown the allegedly
infringing work when they have a "good faith belief that use of the material in the manner
complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law." 17 U.S.C. §
512(c)(3)(A)(v) (2006).
191 Id.
192 Id. (emphasis omitted).
193 Id.
194 Id. The fair use provision of the Copyright Act provides that "the fair use of copy-
righted work.., is not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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a fair use. 95
A. Subjective Good Faith: An Impotent Standard
The Rossi court held that a copyright holder, in assessing whether its copy-
right has been infringed on, is only required to have a subjective, rather than an
objective, "good faith belief' before sending a takedown notice to a third par-
ty.9 In Lenz, the court stated that for the copyright owner to meet the notice
elements required under section 512(c), the copyright owner must make an
initial review prior to sending a takedown notice.'97 The Lenz court expressed
skepticism of the copyright holder's claims that it would be difficult for the
copyright holder to evaluate fair use by stating that it would likely only be in
rare instances that a court would determine that the copyright holder's deter-
mination was in bad faith. 198 Furthermore, in dismissing Universal's interlocu-
tory appeal, the court said that the need for a full "investigation" into whether
the posted material is a fair use "is likely to be extremely rare."' 99 Finally, the
court cautioned that it had "considerable doubt" that Universal would be found
to have acted with the Rossi requirement of subjective bad faith.00
As part of the notification process, a copyright owner is required to identify
the protected material as well as the allegedly infringing material. 0 Such iden-
tification embodies the minimal initial review required by the Lenz court. The
Lenz court rejected Universal's argument that a requirement that the copyright
holder evaluate fair use prior to sending a takedown notice would harm the
holder's ability to rapidly respond.2 2 In cases where the copyright holder's
determination regarding fair use is inaccurate, the court concluded it would be
unlikely that the copyright holder would fail to meet the subjective good faith
standard under section 512(f)." 3
In light of this, Lenz's determination that the DMCA takedown notification
process requires a determination of fair use has no value. Because courts utilize
a subjective standard when judging a copyright holder's good faith," 4 Lenz's
requirement that fair use be included in the copyright holder's determination of
infringement will do nothing to further the purposes of the DMCA. While Lenz
195 Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
196 Rossi v. MPAA, Inc., 391 F. 3d 1000, 1004 (2004).
197 Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1155.
198 Id.
199 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. C 07-3783 JF, 2008 WL 4790669, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 28, 2008).
200 Id. at *3 n.4.
201 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c)(3)(A)(ii)-(iii).
202 Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1155.
203 Id.
204 Id.
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makes clear that fair use is a manner of use authorized by law,"' the value of
this legal clarification as it relates to the DMCA is eviscerated by utilizing a
subjective standard for judging good faith.
Lenz and Rossi together will only allow a misrepresentation claim against a
copyright owner issuing a takedown notice in those cases when the owner
knowingly and materially misidentified his own copyrighted material or the
allegedly infringing material. In all other cases in which the initial review ac-
curately identifies the material, regardless of the presence or absence of any
fair use determination, the result will be the same: no finding of subjective bad
faith and thus no violation of the DMCA. Therefore, pre or post-Lenz, users
cannot cope with ongoing abuse and misuse of the DMCA takedown notice
procedure by copyright holders. An amendment to the DMCA is necessary to
address the problem of de facto enforcement.
Requiring a solely objective standard for judging good faith as it relates to
determinations of whether a use is an infringement or that a takedown notice or
counter-notice was issued with 'knowing' material misrepresentations might
erode some of the extant protection on exclusivity enjoyed by copyright hold-
ers. However, abuse of the takedown procedure will continue without some
strengthening of the current standard. Instead of a standard that is either wholly
subjective or objective, Congress should amend section 512 to expressly in-
clude a hybrid subjective/objective good faith standard that allows for the no-
tice giver's actual subjective good faith to satisfy the statute only in those
situations where the community or society at large would acknowledge that
good faith effort.
Congress can re-establish balance between copyright holders and legal un-
authorized users by implementing a hybrid standard similar to the one used in
determining an individual's privacy interest under the Fourth Amendment.0 6
The equitable result would be the protection of intellectual investment and
promotion of innovation.
In addition, Congress should make requisite each of the six notification ele-
ments under section 512(c)(3) and remove the language of substantial compli-
ance. To do so would cause little imposition, either in time or expense, on the
copyright holder utilizing the takedown notice procedure. At the same time,
this would put the copyright holder on notice that he or she is expected to play
fair while exercising the granted protections. By removing the early use of sub-
stantial compliance language, its later use regarding a service provider's duty
205 Id. at 1154.
206 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating
that in determining a person's right to privacy a hybrid requirement exists which looks at
whether the person exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and whether than expectation
is one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable").
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to attempt the cure of a deficient notice could remain. While "perfect notice"
would still not be required, the above listed changes to the takedown notice
procedure would increase the accountability of copyright holders by giving
meaning to section 512(f), give effect to the Lenz decision, and restore-at
least to a degree-the balance of copyright holder and user interests. The fol-
lowing is specific statutory language meant to amend the DMCA and correct
its current procedural inequities:
B. Proposed, amended language of section 512(c)(3)(A):
To be effective under this subsection, a notification of claimed infringement
must be a written communication provided to the designated agent of a service
provider that includes substantially shall include each of the following:
C. Proposed, amended language of section 512(c)(3)(A)(v):
A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief, both actual
and as recognized by society at large, that use of the material in the manner
complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law -
including, but not limited to fair use.
D. Proposed, amended language of section 512(c)(3)(B)(i-ii):
Subject to clause (ii), a notification from a copyright owner or from a person
authorized to act on behalf of the copyright owner that fails to fully comply
substai lly with the provisions of subparagraph (A) shall not be considered
under paragraph (1)(A) in determining whether a service provider has actual
knowledge or is aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity
is apparent.
In a case in which the notification that is provided to the service provider's
designated agent fails to fully comply substantial! with all the provisions of
subparagraph (A) but substantially cmplies with lauss (ii), (iii), and (i) of
subparagraph +A), clause (i) of this subparagraph applies only if the service
provider promptly attempts to contact the person making the notification or
takes other reasonable steps to assist in the receipt of notification that substan-
timA4 yfully complies with all the provisions of subparagraph (A).
E. Proposed, amended language of section 512(f):
Any person who knewingly, actually knew or should have known if acting
with reasonable care or diligence, and materially misrepresents under this sec-
20091
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tion ....
As it stands, the Lenz ruling will have little practical effect. It will not mean-
ingfully prevent abuse of the DMCA's statutory takedown notice procedure.
Thus, by overprotecting copyright holders, the ruling will potentially curb the
dissemination of information, especially on the Internet, by users either author-
ized or excused under the law. Furthermore, failure on the part of Congress to
address the inequity of the takedown procedure makes it complicit in a statu-
tory scheme wherein the copyright holders are ex officio judge and sheriff and
enforcement is de facto.
VI. CONCLUSION
The requirement that the copyright owner make a good faith determination
as to whether the use was authorized or not, including statutory fair use of the
material, is a helpful clarification. By interpreting the DMCA as requiring only
subjective good faith when determining whether the use was fair makes any
determination as to the material's authorized, excused, or otherwise allowable
use irrelevant. The practical result is that already costly litigation is also likely
un-winnable and thus pointless. The Lenz ruling is trivialized further by the
very ease with which a takedown notice can be sent and acted upon. The harm
to the user-improper takedown-will already have occurred, leaving no prac-
tical recourse. Therefore, regardless of the Lenz court's decision, without either
the recommended congressional action or appellate judicial interpretation that
establishes a standard higher than mere subjectivity, abuse of the takedown
notice procedure will continue, undermining the purpose of the DMCA. Al-
though the speed of technological innovation makes for something of a moving
target, Congress must be timely in addressing such technologies so as not to
lose sight of that objective. As always, any legislation should have the goal of
balancing of often competing interests: protections for intellectual investment
and the societal and economic benefit from continued innovation.
[Vol. 18
